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Abstract	Selective	realism	is	the	thesis	that	some	wisely	chosen	theoretical	posits	are	essential	to	science	and	can	therefore	be	considered	as	true	or	approximately	true.	How	to	choose	them	wisely,	however,	is	a	matter	of	=ierce	contention.	Generally	speaking,	we	should	favor	posits	that	are	effectively	deployed	in	successful	prediction.	In	this	paper	I	propose	a	re=inement	of	the	notion	of	deployment	and	I	argue	that	selective	realism	can	be	extended	to	include	the	analysis	of	how	theoretical	posits	are	actually	deployed	in	symbolic	practices.	
1. Introduction	
Among	the	several	forms	of	realism,	the	so-called	selective	realism	(SelRealism)	is	arguably	the	one	that	engages	history	of	science	more	seriously.	The	driving	idea	of	SelRealism	is	that,	although	theories	as	wholes	are	false	and	doomed	to	be	abandoned,	it	is	possible	to	select	a	certain	number	of	theoretical	posits	(TPs)	that	are	likely	to	be	maintained	in	future	theories	and	are	therefore	true	or	approximately	true.	How	to	determine	these	TPs	is	partly	an	empirical	question—and	this	explains	the	historical	character	of	the	SelRealism	program—but	it	cannot	be	merely	an	empirical	question	lest	one	end	up	in	post-hoc	rationalizations.	A	central	issue	of	
SelRealism,	hence,	is	how	to	specify	criteria	to	properly	conceptualize	the	TPs	on	which	one	should	place	one’s	realist	commitment.	
In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	contemporary	approaches	to	SelRealism	have	neglected	an	important	element	related	to	the	way	in	which	theoretical	claims	are	deployed	in	scienti=ic	theories	(Section	2).	In	Section	3,	I	propose	a	re=inement	of	SelRealism	based	on	the	distinction	between	deploying	a	TP	fundamentally	and	deploying	it	in	a	non-accidental	fashion.	I	use	the	concept	of	symbolic	practices	to	articulate	this	distinction.	Finally,	in	Section	4,	I	clarify	my	points	by	discussing	the	early	development	of	perturbation	theory.	
2. Selective	Realism:	Theory	and	Practice	
The	upholders	of	SelRealism	cherish	two	fundamental	ambitions.	First	and	foremost,	they	aim	at	making	a	good	use	of	the	so-called	no-miracles	argument	(NMA)	according	to	which	one	can	justi=iably	infer	the	truth	(or	the	approximate	truth)	of	a	successful	theory,	because,	otherwise,	the	success	would	remained	inexplicable.	The	NMA	is	considered	to	be	the	strongest	support	to	realisms	of	any	sort	(Musgrave	1988;	Psillos	1999,	68-94).	A	challenging	objection	to	the	NMA	is	the	pessimistic	meta-induction	(PMI)	originally	formulated	by	Larry	Laudan.	According	to	this	argument,	the	success	of	a	theory	is	never	a	suf=icient	reason	to	infer	even	its	approximate	truth	because	history	of	science	is	replete	with	examples	of	very	successful	theories	that	wound	up	overthrown	at	some	later	stage.	As	it	is	likely	the	case	that	our	most	successful	theories	will	suffer	the	same	fate	in	the	future,	one	has	
to	conclude	that	the	realist	commitment	is	not	justi=ied	(Laudan	1981).	Among	the	several	responses	to	the	PMI,	one	consists	in	noticing	that	the	failures	of	past	theories,	in	fact,	did	not	depend	on	those	TPs	that	lead	them	to	success.	In	other	words,	granted	Laudan’s	point	that	successful	past	theories	are	false	as	wholes,	it	can	still	be	argued	that	the	constituents	of	those	theories	that	were	responsible	for	their	empirical	success	have	been	retained	in	our	current	science.	Thus,	the	realist	needs	only	to	shift	her	commitment	from	theories	as	wholes	to	those	enduring	TPs	that,	being	essential	for	success,	can	be	justi=iably	believed	to	be	true	or	approximately	true.	
The	next	question	is,	of	course,	how	to	determine	those	TPs.	Thus,	the	second	ambition	of	the	upholders	of	SelRealism	is	to	solve	the	problem	of	selectivity	in	some	principled	way	and	so	beat	the	PMI.	In	one	of	the	=irst	instantiations	of	SelRealism,	Philip	Kitcher	argued	that	one	must	“distinguish	between	those	parts	of	theory	that	are	genuinely	used	in	the	success	and	those	that	are	idle	wheels”	(Kitcher	1993,	143).	The	point	of	this	distinction	is	that	credit	for	the	success	of	a	theory	should	be	due	only	to	those	TPs	that	effectively	contribute	to	it.	Elaborating	on	Kitcher’s	intuition,	one	can	argue	that	the	program	of	SelRealism	is	based	on	two	major	conditions:	
(S)	Success	condition:	the	selection	of	the	important	TPs	must	hinge	on	their	relation	with	some	signi=icant	success	of	the	theory.	
(D)	Deployment	condition:	one	must	select	those	TPs	that	were	effectively	used	in	scoring	that	success.	
Let	me	brie=ly	comment	on	these	two	conditions.	While	(S)	is	now	a	realist	trademark,	the	deployment	condition	(D)	is	what	sets	apart	SelRealism	from	other	forms	of	realism,	such	as	structural	realism,	also	engaged	in	picking	out	enduring	elements	of	scienti=ic	theories	(Worrall	1989;	Chakravartty	2011).	It	is	also	important	to	notice	that	(S)	and	(D)	are	independent	conditions.	Firstly,	(S)	refers	to	a	relation	between	the	selected	TP	and	empirical	success,	while	(D)	refers	to	a	relation	between	the	TP	and	the	rest	of	the	theory.	Secondly,	either	condition	can	be	satis=ied	separately.	(D)	has	been	added	precisely	to	avoid	those	cases	in	which	idle	TPs	are	involved	in	empirical	success	and,	obviously,	there	are	scores	of	examples	of	TPs	used	by	theories	which	however	never	led	to	any	success.	It	follows	that,	while	(S)	is	supposed	to	meet	the	=irst	ambition	of	SelRealism,	the	second	ambition,	to	block	the	PMI,	is	on	(D).	
So	much	for	SelRealism	in	theory.	Let	us	now	examine	how	this	program	has	been	carried	out	in	practice.	One	of	the	=irst	philosophers	to	seriously	elaborate	on	Kitcher’s	suggestion	was	Stathis	Psillos.	His	criterion	for	selecting	TPs	works	in	the	following	way	(Psillos	1999,	110).	Let	us	assume	that	a	certain	successful	prediction	P	can	be	obtained	by	combining	the	TPs	H,	H’	and	the	auxiliaries	A. 	According	to	1
	For	virtually	all	writers,	empirical	success	means	“successful	prediction”.	David	1Harker	has	leveled	important	criticisms	against	this	tendency	to	interpret	success	in	terms	of	individual	predictions	and	has	suggested	that	success	should	be	understood	as	progress,	i.e.	in	terms	of	the	improvements	a	theory	makes	with	respect	to	its	predecessors	(Harker	2008,	2013).
Psillos,	the	TP	H	is	essential	to	success	P	and	should	be	considered	true	or	approximately	true	if	and	only	if:	
(1) H’	and	A	alone	do	not	lead	to	P.	
(2) There	is	no	alternative	H*	to	H	such	that:	
(a) H*	is	consistent	with	H’	and	A;	
(b) H*,	H’,	and	A	lead	to	P;	
(c) H*	is	not	ad	hoc	or	otherwise	purposefully	concocted	to	lead	to	P.		
This	criterion	is	the	bedrock	of	Psillos’s	divide	et	impera	strategy.	The	driving	intuition	behind	it	is	to	capture	the	indispensability	of	H:	we	should	place	our	realist	commitment	upon	those	TPs	without	which	empirical	success	cannot	be	obtained.	However,	Tim	Lyons	has	cogently	argued	that	Psillos's	criterion	fails	to	characterize	indispensability	(Lyons	2006).	The	indispensability	of	H	should	be	ensured	by	condition	(2),	which	states,	in	brief,	that	H	cannot	be	replaced	by	any	other	TP.	But,	Lyons	notices,	“there	will	always	be	other	hypotheses,	albeit	some	that	we	=ind	very	unappealing,	from	which	any	given	prediction	can	be	derived”	(Lyons	2006,	540).	More	importantly,	Lyons	argues,	Psillos’s	criterion	is	not	even	an	effective	means	for	credit	attribution,	because	it	does	not	tell	us	much	about	how	H	contributes	to	the	empirical	success	P.	In	particular,	condition	(2)	has	no	relevance	whatsoever	for	H’s	speci=ic	contribution,	because	it	only	concerns	conceivable	alternatives	to	H,	alternatives	that,	if	H	is	at	hand,	nobody	would	even	bother	to	explore.	Lyons	
perceptively	stresses	that	the	problem	with	Psillos’s	criterion	boils	down	to	the	fact	that	it	obliterates	condition	(D):	“by	introducing	his	criterion,	[Psillos]	has	discarded	the	central	idea	of	deployment	realism—introduced	by	Kitcher	and	seemingly	advocated	by	Psillos	himself”	(Lyons	2006,	541).	It	is	interesting	to	note	that,	by	dropping	condition	(D),	Psillos’s	position	becomes	vulnerable	to	another	form	of	PMI.	One	could	think	of	getting	around	of	Lyons’s	=irst	objection	by	arguing	that,	even	though	an	alternative	to	H	is	always	conceivable,	at	the	present	state	of	our	knowledge	it	is	not,	therefore	the	objection	is	empty.	In	other	words,	one	could	inject	the	time	factor	in	Psillos’s	criterion	and	make	it	a	statement	of	our	actual	best	knowledge.	But	then	the	PMI	crops	up	again,	because	history	shows	that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	what	is	indispensable	today	will	be	so	tomorrow.	The	whole	point	of	the	PMI	is	that	there	is	nothing	special	in	our	knowledge	as	far	as	it	is	considered	present,	because	there	have	been	a	lot	of	present	knowledges	that	have	been	blissfully	abandoned.	This	is	why	one	needs	condition	(D):	what	makes	our	present	knowledge	so	special	is	not	its	happening	at	a	certain	time,	but	its	having	gone	through	a	certain	process,	i.e.,	a	form	of	deployment.	The	fact	that	our	present	knowledge	has	been	deployed	at	lengths	and	it	is	still	with	us	constitutes	a	reason	to	believe	that	it	is	true	or	approximately	true.	
3. Deconstructing	Deployment	
Having	grasped	that	the	=law	in	Psillos’s	criterion	is	the	dropping	of	the	deployment	condition,	Lyons	suggests	to	run	to	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	and	to	in=late	
dramatically	the	notion	of	deployment.	His	“responsibility	model”	consists	in	discarding	selectivity	altogether	and	in	considering	responsible	for	the	empirical	success	of	a	theory	each	and	every	element	that	was	originally	deployed:	“credit	will	have	to	be	attributed	to	all	responsible	constituents,	including	mere	heuristics	(such	as	mystical	beliefs),	weak	analogies,	mistaken	calculations,	logically	invalid	reasoning	etc.”	(Lyons	2006,	543).	Clearly,	Lyons’s	proposal	amounts	to	a	crack-up	of	the	entire	SelRealism	program.	But,	more	importantly,	I	do	not	think	that	the	responsibility	model	captures	the	correct	signi=icance	of	(D).	As	my	previous	considerations	about	the	PMI	show,	the	deployment	condition	is	not	merely	supposed	to	tell	us	that	a	TP	has	been	effectively	used	in	obtaining	empirical	success	(as	opposed	to	be	
dispensable),	but	also	that	it	has	been	robustly	so	(as	opposed	to	be	merely	
accidental).	What	makes	it	plausible	that	a	TP	will	still	play	a	role	in	future	theories	is	the	fact	that	its	importance	for	empirical	success	has	been	tested	by	extensive	and	repeated	deployment.	It	is	therefore	clear	that	there	are	two	ideas	nested	in	the	deployment	condition.	One	is	the	idea,	captured	by	Psillos’s	criterion,	that	signi=icant	TPs	must	play	a	fundamental	role	in	success	in	order	to	distinguish	them	from	idle	hypotheses;	the	other	is	the	idea	that	the	deployment	of	a	TP	must	ensure	that	its	success	is	not	accidental.	These	are	two	distinct	ideas.	It	might	happen,	for	example,	that	a	TP	plays	an	essential	role	in	deriving	a	prediction	in	virtue	of	fortuitous	factors	cancellation	or	other	favorable	circumstances.	So,	while	an	intensive	deployment	ensure	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP,	an	extensive	deployment	founds	its	robustness.	Both	fundamentality	and	robustness	are	ways	to	articulate	the	complex	relation	between	a	
TP	and	the	rest	of	the	theory,	or	at	least	some	parts	of	the	theory	(more	on	this	in	a	bit).	Further,	while	fundamentality	is	an	atemporal	articulation	of	this	relation, 	2robustness	concerns	precisely	the	temporal	dimension	of	the	deployment	condition	that	escaped	Lyons’s	analysis:	robustness,	as	we	shall	see	below,	is	achieved	over	time.	
In	order	to	clarify	the	distinction	between	fundamentality	and	robustness,	I	introduce	the	notion	of	symbolic	practices.	By	symbolic	practices	I	mean	all	the	methods	customarily	used	in	science	to	manipulate	symbols. 	These	include,	but	are	not	3limited	to,	mathematical	methods,	formal	tools,	approximations	procedures,	models,	heuristics,	solution	tricks,	and	any	sort	of	way	by	which	one	can	transform	a	symbolic	expression	into	another	symbolic	expression.	Symbolic	practices	are	the	set	of	methods	adopted	by	a	theory	to	“put	to	work”	a	certain	TP	or,	in	other	words,	to	deploy	it	in	order	to	set	problems	and	to	interpret	solutions.	By	using	the	concept	of	symbolic	practices,	one	can	reformulate	the	two	ideas	of	the	deployment	condition	in	the	following	way:	
	Of	course	the	fundamentality	of	a	TP	can	change	over	time	because	it	can	become	2more	or	less	fundamentally	used.	However,	the	relation	in	itself	does	not	concern	this	change.	My	discussion	is	especially	tailored	on	the	case	of	mathematical	physics.	I	do	not	3exclude,	however,	that	it	can	be	suitably	extended	to	other	branches	of	science	by	taking	an	appropriately	enlarged	notion	of	symbolic	practices.
(F)	Fundamentality:	A	TP	must	be	embedded	in	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	that	lead	to	empirical	success.	
(R)	Robustness:	The	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	deploy	the	TP	must	be	reliable.	
Let	us	begin	with	(F).	This	idea	hinges	on	the	“embeddedness”	of	a	TP	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices.	An	empirical	success,	a	successful	prediction	or	an	explanation,	is	obtained	by	starting	with	one	TP—or,	better,	its	symbolic	codi=ication—and	by	deriving	from	it	the	phenomena	to	be	treated	by	means	of	suitable	manipulations.	In	their	analysis	of	the	path	from	TP	to	success,	philosophers	usually	disregard	the	epistemic	role	played	by	symbolic	manipulations	of	TPs.	But	if	we	neglect	this	important	factor	of	the	process	of	predicting/explaining,	we	are	left	with	no	other	option	than	characterizing	fundamentality	as	a	relation	between	TPs,	i.e.,	a	‘Psillosian’	criterion	and	then	a	‘Lyonsnesque’	argument	can	easily	prove	that	this	falls	short	of	providing	a	satisfactory	notion	of	fundamentality.	In	my	proposal,	fundamentality	is	rather	a	relation	between	TP	and	the	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	transform	and	manipulate	it.	Although	intuitively	clear	enough,	the	concept	of	embededdness	admittedly	needs	further	philosophical	analysis.	In	Section	4,	I	provide	a	historical	example	to	clarify	what	it	means	for	a	TP	to	be	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices.	
Before	discussing	the	example,	however,	I	need	to	analyze	brie=ly	the	idea	of	robustness.	Condition	(R)	states	that	reliability,	and	hence	robustness,	is	a	property	of	the	symbolic	practices	themselves.	In	other	words,	and	this	is	the	central	point,	a	TP	
can	be	made	more	robust	by	means	of	historically	and	rationally	describable	strategies	conceived	to	enhance	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	adopted	to	put	it	to	work.	One	way	to	appreciate	this	point	is	to	notice	that	the	concept	of	reliability	has	three	main	components.	First,	there	is	an	empirical	component,	that	is	its	connection	with	success.	It	is	expected	that	reliable	symbolic	practices	have	led	and	will	lead	to	empirical	success.	This	is	unsurprising,	because	it	is	still	part	of	the	relation	between	(D)	and	the	NMA.	Second,	there	is	a	conceptual	component:	reliable	symbolic	practices	allow	us	to	distinguish	between	real	facts	of	nature	and	artifacts.	This	is	the	component	that	accounts	for	the	non-accidentality	of	success	and	it	depends	on	the	adoption	of	strategies	to	enhance	reliability.	Applying	symbolic	practices	to	multiple	cases,	relating	them	with	other,	better	understood,	sets	of	practices	(e.g.,	by	showing	structure	similarities),	generalizing	solution	methods,	simplifying	computation	procedures,	introducing	redundant	check	routines,	improving	the	symbolic	notation,	multiplying	proof	procedures	are	just	a	few	examples	of	strategies	used	to	ensure	that	the	result	of	symbolic	manipulation	is	a	real	information	and	not	an	artifact	generated	by	the	practice	itself. 	Finally,	there	is	a	historical	component.	As	I	said	above,	4deployment	is	a	process	extended	over	time.	When	are	we	justi=ied	to	consider	a	result	as	reliable?	This	is	an	agent-	and	a	context-dependent	component	of	reliability.	
	This	component	of	the	concept	of	reliability	is	closely	connected	with	the	usual	4notion	of	robustness	(see,	e.g.,	(Soler	et	al.	2012)	for	an	overview).	Indeed,	robustness	has	to	do	with	the	multiplications	of	methods	of	check	and	control	as	a	way	to	distinguish	what	is	real	and	what	is	fabricated	by	practices.
I	submit	that	this	component	can	be	clari=ied	in	terms	of	control.	We	develop	theories	because	we	need	to	manipulate	symbols	in	order	to	make	predictions	and	explanations.	It	is	reasonable	to	state	that	an	agent	considers	reliable	a	theory	when	she	has	control	on	it,	when	she	knows	how	to	do	things,	where	the	theory	can	be	applied,	to	what	extent,	what	kind	of	information	she	can	obtain,	what	kind	of	epistemic	risks	are	involved	in	it,	how	to	improve	progressively	the	performance	and	a	lot	of	other	things	related	to	the	general	idea	of	knowing	what	is	going	on.	Thus,	reliability	can	change	over	time	in	virtue	of	new	information	and	further	inquiry.	This	component	accounts	for	the	fact	that	science	is	an	ongoing	human	endeavor.	
To	sum	up,	I	propose	to	extend	SelRealism	in	the	following	way:	
(SelRealism+)	We	are	entitled	to	consider	the	TP	H	as	true	or	approximately	true	at	time	t	if	and	only	if:	
1. H	is	embedded	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	S	
2. S	is	reliable	
3. H	and	S	lead	to	signi=icant	success	
This	is	a	more	selective	version	of	SelRealism,	because	the	philosophical	and	historiographical	program	stemming	from	it	extends	the	inquiry	to	the	strategies	adopted	to	improve	the	reliability	of	symbolic	practices	and	the	contingent	conditions	for	control.	As	stated	in	condition	3,	the	units	of	analysis	of	SelRealism+	are	TPs-cum-
practices	rather	than	TPs	only.	In	the	following	section,	I	provide	an	example	of	what	I	mean	by	intensive	and	extensive	deployment.	
4. The	Coming	of	Age	of	Perturbation	Theory	
The	Principia	Mathematica	are	a	supreme	example	of	how	to	embed	a	TP,	in	this	case	the	gravitational	law,	into	a	set	of	symbolic	practices. 	However,	Newton’s	mainly	5geometrical	methods	were	fantastically	complicated	and	notoriously	dif=icult	to	master.	A	signi=icant	breakthrough	in	what	came	to	be	called	celestial	mechanics	happened	in	the	mid-1740s,	when	Leonhard	Euler	laid	down	the	foundations	of	analytical	perturbation	theory.	Euler	made	a	number	of	decisive	steps	forward.	First,	he	used	the	gravitational	law	to	formulate	general	equations	of	motion	for	celestial	problems.	Second,	he	introduced	the	use	of	trigonometric	series	to	construct	approximate	solutions.	The	use	of	these	series	also	depended	crucially	on	the	gravitational	law,	because	it	satis=ied	the	assumption	that	planetary	orbits,	even	under	perturbations,	can	be	represented	by	a	combination	of	periodic	functions.	Finally	he	introduced	manipulation	practices	such	as	the	method	of	the	variation	of	
	In	what	follows,	I	consider	perturbation	theory	as	the	set	of	practices	conceived	to	5put	to	work	the	gravitational	law.	It	must	be	noted	that	other	TPs	were	involved	(e.g.,	Newton’s	laws	of	dynamics)	and	that	the	gravitational	law	can	be	decomposed	in	further	assumptions	such	as	the	action-at-a-distance,	the	instantaneous	propagation	and	so	forth.	These	considerations	affect	the	level	of	detail	of	my	example,	but	not	the	structure	of	my	argument.
constants	and	the	method	of	successive	approximations	to	solve	the	equations	of	motion.	Perturbation	theory	is	therefore	a	clear	example	of	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	conceived	to	cast	a	TP	into	a	manipulable	form	and	to	applied	it	to	speci=ic	problems.	
For	the	purpose	of	this	paper,	I	distinguish	two	phases	in	the	early	history	of	perturbation	theory.	The	=irst	phase	goes	roughly	from	the	mid-1740s	to	the	mid-1760s	and	it	concerns	the	cause	of	numerous	astronomical	anomalies.	Newton	had	left	behind	a	few	conundrums	that	even	his	genius	was	unable	to	unravel.	The	most	conspicuous	of	these	problems	was	the	precession	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	Newton's	Lunar	theory,	elaborated	in	Book	I	and	III	of	the	Principia	only	managed	to	obtain	half	of	the	observed	value.	In	the	1740s,	there	were	two	approaches	to	the	issue	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	The	analytical	approach	adopted	the	gravitational	law,	or	a	slightly	modi=ied	form	of	it,	and	tried	to	calculate	the	observed	precession	by	analytical	methods	only.	The	physical	approach	supposed	that	the	observed	anomalies	could	be	due	to	material	causes	such	as	a	resisting	medium	or	interplanetary	vortices.	It	is	important	to	realize	that	these	approaches	were	compatible.	Euler	himself	supported	both	the	resisting	medium	hypothesis	and	the	analytical	approach	and	occasionally	also	proposed	the	use	of	vortices	(letter	to	Clairaut,	30	September	1747).	For	several	years,	the	best	mathematicians	of	Europe	struggled	with	the	riddle	of	the	Lunar	apogee		(Bodenmann	2010)	until,	on	21	January	1749,	Alexis	Clairaut	showed	that	if	one	pushes	the	approximation	to	the	second	order	of	the	perturbation,	some	terms	that	are	negligible	at	the	=irst	order	become	sizable	and	generate	the	missing	half	of	the	precession	(Clairaut	1752).	
Clairaut’s	success	was	surely	an	impressive	breakthrough,	but	what	made	it	so	impactful	was	not	the	brute	fact	that	gravitational	law	had	eventually	led	to	a	successful	explanation.	Physical	hypotheses	such	as	vortices	and	resisting	medium	also	provided	an	explanation	of	the	observed	precession.	The	crucial	difference	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	gravitational	law	could	be	fully	integrated	with	the	analytical	practices	and	then	manipulated	to	provide	suitable	symbolic	expressions	of	the	precession	of	the	apogee.	That	did	not	happen	with	the	physical	hypotheses,	although	not	for	lack	of	trying.	Euler,	for	instance,	tried	hard	to	integrate	the	hypothesis	of	the	resisting	medium	in	perturbation	theory,	but	the	ensuing	equations	of	motion	were	simply	unmanageable	(Euler	1747).	Clairaut’s	success	is	eminently	a	story	of	intensive	use	of	the	gravitational	law:	he	managed	to	integrate	it	with	a	set	of	symbolic	practices	and	to	accommodate	effectively	the	observations.	
Clairaut’s	feat	did	not	close	the	debate	on	the	gravitational	law,	tough.	His	calculations	used	many	case-based	assumptions,	simpli=ications,	and	shortcuts	and	its	straightforward	extension	to	more	complex	cases,	such	as	the	behavior	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn,	was	doubtful	to	say	the	least.	But	there	was	also	a	deeper	problem.	At	some	point	in	his	analysis,	Clairaut	obtained	an	“arc	of	circle”,	i.e.,	a	trigonometric	function	multiplied	by	time.	Such	terms	are	obviously	unbounded	and	hence	make	the	whole	trigonometric	series	diverge.	Clairaut	got	rid	of	it	by	ad-hoc	assumptions,	but	the	status	of	these	unbounded	terms	remained	unclear:	they	could	represent	an	artifact	of	the	theory,	a	limitation	of	its	predictive	power	or	even	a	dynamical	instability	of	the	system.		
Soon,	the	problem	of	the	arcs	of	circle	become	more	troublesome.	Euler	found	the	same	terms	in	his	analysis	of	the	motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	and	in	1766	Lagrange	proved	that	they	are	actually	a	necessary	consequence	of	the	method	of	successive	approximations	applied	to	astronomical	problems	(Lagrange	1766).	Thus,	in	the	mid-1760s,	perturbation	theory	appeared	to	be	a	fragile	set	of	practices	which	had	scored	some	important	success,	but	was	still	marred	with	problems	of	unreliability	under	certain	conditions.	From	the	late	1760s	onwards,	the	issue	of	improving	the	robustness	of	perturbation	theory	became	a	central	preoccupation	of	the	leading	mathematicians	interested	in	physical	astronomy.	
There	were	two	programs	inspired	by	this	issue.	On	the	one	hand,	Lagrange	tried	to	improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	methods	as	a	mathematical	theory.	He	carried	out	this	project	by	means	of	multiple	strategies:	(1)	enhancing	the	relation	between	perturbation	theory	and	other	branches	of	mathematics	(e.g.,	potential	theory);	(2)	elaborating	arguments	to	extract	information	from	the	equations	of	motion	without	solving	them	(e.g.,	by	using	integrals	of	motion);	(3)	improving	methods	to	simplify	the	solution	procedure	(e.g.,	Lagrange’s	coordinates);	(4)	introducing	new	symbolic	codi=ications	to	manipulate	the	equations	of	motion	(e.g.,	the	perturbing	function);	(5)	making	the	notation	less	cumbersome	(Lagrange’s	coef=icients).	Around	the	same	years,	Laplace	was	also	working	to	improve	the	reliability	of	perturbation	theory,	but	his	program	adopted	a	different	approach.	He	concentrated	on	methods	to	make	perturbation	theory	a	more	reliable	problem-solving	tool.		He	developed	his	own	method	to	eliminate	the	arcs	of	circle—which	was	based	on	the	recalculation	of	the	
integration	constants—he	imported	probability	theory	and	the	equations	of	condition	to	deal	with	astronomical	observations	and	devised	several	strategies	to	identify	in	concrete	cases	those	elements	of	the	equations	of	motion	that	were	likely	to	produce	sizable	perturbation	terms	at	higher	order.	Both	Lagrange’s	and	Laplace’s	programs	scored	their	own	successes.	In	the	early	1780s,	Lagrange	proved	a	very	general	result	of	stability	according	to	which	the	three	more	important	orbital	elements	(mean	motion,	eccentricity,	and	inclination)	are	invariable	or	bounded	(Lagrange	1781).	Laplace,	on	his	part,	explained	the	decades-long	problems	of	the	anomaly	in	the	motion	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	as	well	as	the	secular	acceleration	of	the	Moon	(Laplace	1785,	1787;	Wilson	1985).		
5. Conclusions	
In	several	places,	Kyle	Stanford	has	argued	that	any	selection	of	enduring	TPs	is	ultimately	ungrounded	and,	consequently,	the	entire	SelRealism	program	is	unviable	(Stanford	2003,	2006).	In	his	view,	there	are	two	possible	ways	to	select	essential	TPs.	The	=irst	way	is	to	trust	scientists	when	they	say	that	a	certain	posit	is	fundamental.	However,	neither	commonsense,	nor,	more	importantly,	historical	records	support	the	hypothesis	that	scientists’	take	on	this	matter	is	or	should	be	particularly	reliable.	The	other	option	is	to	wait	and	see:	when	a	theory	is	superseded,	one	can	check	which	TPs	have	survived.	The	reason	why	a	selective	realist	cannot	go	with	this	option,	however,	has	been	summarized	effectively	by	Peter	Vickers:	
If	we	cannot	identify	the	working	posits	of	a	theory	until	it	has	been	superseded	by	some	other	theory,	then	realism	is	no	longer	about	identifying	what	we	ought	to	believe	to	be	true:	one	is	always	waiting	for	the	next	theory	to	come	along	to	tell	us	which	parts	of	our	current	theory	are	working	posits.	(Vickers	2013,	207)	
From	this,	Stanford	concludes	that	SelRealism	without	prospectively	applicable	selectivity	criteria	is	empty	and	should	be	replaced	by	a	more	modest	form	of	realism.	But	Stanford’s	wait-and-see	stance	is	neither	necessary	nor	suf=icient	to	do	the	job	it	is	supposed	to	do,	i.e.,	to	pick	out	essential	TPs.	It	is	not	suf=icient	because	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	TPs	survived	one	theory	change	will	survive	the	next	ones.	It	is	not	necessary	because	we	do	not	need	the	next	theory	to	form	reasonable	judgements	about	essential	TPs.	As	I	have	shown	above,	science	provides	a	variety	of	strategies	to	improve	the	reliability	of	the	TP-cum-practices	and	hence	good	reasons	to	believe,	
within	the	actual	theory,	that	a	certain	TP	intensively	and	extensively	deployed	is	in	fact	essential.		
From	this	perspective,	Stanford’s	argument	simply	sets	the	epistemic	bar	too	high.	By	stating	that	the	essentiality	of	a	TP	can	be	adjudicated	only	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	superseding	theory,	he	implicitly	challenges	the	realist	to	provide	a	“superselection	rule”	able	to	capture	the	whole	history	of	science,	a	task	that	the	realist	is	neither	willing,	nor	actually	requested	to	accomplish.	By	contrast,	the	historical	and	philosophical	program	of	SelRealism+	moves	from	the	conviction	that	TPs	and	symbolic	practices	follow	a	dynamics	able	to	=ilter	out	inessential	
components.	Consequently,	SelRealism+	is	committed	to	historically	identify	and	philosophically	analyze	this	dynamics	and	to	trace	the	genealogy	of	our	theories	in	terms	of	the	processes	of	codi=ication,	manipulation,	and	stabilization	of	TPs.	Ultimately,	this	program	aims	at	producing	new	and	interesting	historical	narratives	of	theory	change.	It	remains	true	that	the	strategies	making	up	the	theoretical	dynamics	only	provide	good	reasons	to	allocate	the	realist	commitment.	It	might	happen	that	the	judgement	on	the	reliability	of	the	TPs-cum-practices	change	over	time	in	virtue	of	further	inquiry	or	new	information.	This	fact,	as	stated	above,	follows	from	the	fallibility	of	science	as	a	human	endeavor	and,	as	such,	should	not	trouble	the	realist.	
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